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I. INTRODUCTION
As financial engineering is becoming more sophisticated andderivatives markets
more liquid, firms are undertaking active risk management policies in increasing numbers
(Nance, Smith and Smithson 1993). Many risk management programs include the use of
financial derivatives such as options and futures to hedge exposures including cash flow
variance and interest rate and foreign exchange risk. These types ofhedging transactions
address the risks associated with specific aspects ofthe firm's business. Inthis paper, we
will develop a simple model for an internal hedge ofthe firm's assets, addressing risk
management as a firm-wide, valuecreating undertaking. Wewill then examinethe
implications ofsuch a hedging policy on the cost ofdebt in greater detail.
1.1 Modlgliani-Miller
In their famous paper, Modigliani and Miller (1958) set forth a theory ofcapital
structure inwhich the value ofthe firm is independent of the debt-equity mix ofthe firm.
This proposition is the result ofa no-arbitrage condition imposed on the prices ofthe equity
shares ofevery firm in the market. Furthermore, the no-arbitrage logic ofModigliani and
Miller makes unnecessary particular types ofcorporate hedging because investors who hold
equity in a firm can always manage the risk associated with their ownership ofthat firm by
managing theirentire portfolios. If a riskaverse investor feels that shehas toomuch risk
exposure by holding shares ofaparticular firm, she can easily remedy the situation by
divesting mthat firm and instead purchasing a less risky asset or portfolio ofassets. These
results, however, are achieved under strong assumptions ofperfect capital markets, no taxes,
no transaction costs, and fixed investment policy.
TheModigliani andMiller results have implications for specific types of hedging.
Theirwork, however, does notpreclude hedging certain exposures of the firm. If the
hedging strategy onlydecreases thevariance of the profit of the firm (theexactdefinition of
profit is not important here), without increasing theexpected profit, hedging will not increase
thevalue of the firm. To beeffective in increasing the value of the firm, the hedging strategy
must decrease the variance of a variable in which the profit (value) of the firm is concave. It
is upon this foundation that the recenthedging literature is based.
1.2 Concavity and Expected Firm Value
Inordertojudge the merits of hedging policy, we rely onJensen's Inequality, a
simple property ofconcave functions (see, for example, Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green).
Let f{X) be a real valued, concave function. Then Jensen's inequality states that
EmX)\<f[EiX)].
In fact, this isone way to define a concave function in two dimensions (Simon and Blume
1994). If, by hedging, we are able to decrease the variance of a variable in which firm value
is concave, we are able to increase firm value. Jensen's inequality is a critical result for
judging the merit ofa hedging strategy. Note that the inequality reverses for a convex
fijnction. If, for example, cash flow is a concave function ofasset value, then the expected
cash flow from the hedged firm will behigher than the expected cash flow from the un
hedged firm ifthe hedge successfully decreases the variability ofasset value. Thus,
determining the validity ofa hedging strategy involves studying the curvature ofthe firm's
value with respect to the variable that ishedged.
1.3 Hedging Motivation
By relaxing the assumptions ofModigliani and Miller, many authors have suggested
justifications for corporate hedging. Smith and Stultz (1985) acknowledge that, under the
restrictive assumptions ofModigliani and Miller, there is no incentive for the firm to hedge.
In order for hedging to increase firm value, the hedge must decrease taxes or contracting
cost, or affect the firm's investment decision. All of the hedging arguments of Smith and
Stultz (as well as most other authors) are dependent upon the convexity or concavity of firm
value in variables such as taxes, contracting costs, and manager's wealth. This generalization
follows from Jensen's inequality.
To justify hedging aimed at reducing tax liability, Smith and Stultz first assume that
the amount of tax paid by the firm is a convex function of the pre-tax value of the firm. This
follows from the observation that, under US tax code, the marginal tax rate is an increasing
function of the pre-tax value of the firm. Under this assumption, the after-tax value of the
firm is a concave function of the pre-tax value of the firm. By Jensen's inequality, the firm
can increase the expected after-tax value of the firm by decreasing the variability of the pre
tax value of the firm using a hedge on firm value. This is the same type ofargument that we
will exploit in justifying asset value hedging.
The next issue addressed by Smith and Stultz is that of the transaction costs
associated with bankruptcy as a motivation to hedge. First, assume a standard firm liability
structure where the claims of equity holders are subordinate to the claims of the debt holders
and there is onlyoneclassof debt. Thedebtholders have been promised a payment of FV
(facevalue) at some timeT in the future. The actual amount paid on that promise is
dependent on the value of the firm, V, at timeT. If FV is greater than the value of the firm,
then the debt holders receive an amount equal to V - C, where C is the transaction cost of
bankruptcy, and the equity holders receive nothing. Ifthe firm is solvent at time T, then the
bondholders receive FV and the equity holders receive V- FV. Here, ifby hedging, the firm
can reduce the variability ofthe value ofthe firm at time T, then the probability that the finn
will be insolvent at time Twill decrease. Thus, the expected cost ofbankruptcy will decrease
and the value ofthe equity will increase. Simply, a firm that has a lower probability of
bankruptcy has a higher value.
Smith and Stultz assert that, if the firm announces that it will hedge to reduce the cost
ofbankruptcy after the financing decision, there is little incentive for the firm to follow
through on that announcement once the firm has undertaken the financing. In fact,
shareholders may not want the firm to hedge at all as it will tend to redistribute wealth away
from the stockholders to the bondholders in the case of bankruptcy. Thus, the promise the
hedge may not be credible. Smith and Stultz, however, assert that there are circumstances
under which the promise to hedge may be made credible. First, a firm that is a fi-equent
borrower can develop areputation for actually carrying out the promise to hedge. By
hedging, the firm may also lower the cost offinancial distress. The firm may be able to
avoid activating covenants in their bond contracts that alter the investment decisions that the
firm is able to undertake. This concept ofunderinvestment is a recurring theme in the
hedging literature and will be used in our model as well. In my model, hedging is undertaken
prior to financing, so the incentive conflict is less of an issue.
Minton and Schrand (1999) investigate the effect ofcash flow variability on the
firm's investment decision empirically. By regressing the level of investment on an industiy
adjusted measure ofoperating cash flow variation and two proxies for sales growth of the
firm, they find that volatile cash flow is correlated with lower investment. They then run
another set ofregressions and find that more volatile cash flows are associated with lower
bond ratings and higher yields to maturity, suggesting that volatile cash flows do have a
negative effect on the cost of capital. By hedging cash flows, the firm is able to rely less on
externally generated funds and will tend to invest at a level closer to the first best outcome
where all funds are costless. Later,we will formalize and simulate this effect of hedging on
debt yield.
All of the motivation for hedging discussed so far do not require risk aversion, but
rather rely on non-linearity in taxes and bankruptcy costs. The final motivation of hedging
addressed by Smithand Stultz, however, relates to the risk aversion of firm managers. The
managers' compensation is assumed to dependon the value of the firm. If the manager's
wealth is a concave function of the value of the firm, then by Jensen's inequality, the
managerwill be strictlybetter off if she reduces the variability of the firm's payoffs throu^
hedging transactions. Furthermore, if the manager is risk averse, even if wealth is not
concave in firm value, theremay be an incentive for the manager to hedge. As longas there
is a positive relationship (linear, concave, or convex) between firm value and the manager's
wealth themanager can stillmaximize expected utility byhedging because the manager's
utility is a concave fiinction of firm value under riskaversion. Stultz (1984) developed a
continuous time model specifically for hedging exchange rate risk under similar assumptions
ofmanagement compensation inwhich he found that, with risk averse managers, the firm
will hedge. DeMarzo and Duffie (1995) take this analysis further and examine the role of
asymmetric information between managers and shareholders and the incentive to hedge.
They find that, based on the accounting standards used, managers who are not forced to fiilly
disclose hedging activities have an incentive to fully hedge the firm's accounting profits.
Those who must fiilly disclose hedging accounts may not hedge at all.
Many arguments have been developedto support the practice of corporate risk
management. In this paper, we will show that, if the value of the firm is represented as an
uncertain cash flow dependent upon the level of investment and the costof external financing
of thatinvestment, then the firm value can be increased through hedging transactions.
1.4 Froot, Scharfstem and Stein's Cash Flow Model
Onestraight forward cash flow model byFroot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993) (FSS
henceforth) demonstrated that, with costly external financing convex in the level of external
financing and a concave production function, firm value can be increased by undertaking
hedging transactions (fora briefdescription of the model, see Appendix A). The
effectiveness of the hedge depends onthe amount ofcurvature ofthe firm's production and
cost of debt functions. This is intuitively appealing because as the amount of external
financing reaches very high levels, investors will demand a high return onany debt
instruments that they purchase from the firm and, thus, the cost of taking oneven more debt
increases. Inthe extreme case, external financing becomes infinitely expensive ascapital
markets become inaccessible to debt-laden firms.
The FSS model is based on the assumption that market imperfections make external
financing more expensive than internal financing. Ifcash flows are variable, then the firm
has two choices when financing investment. They can either vary the amount ofinvestment,
or they can vary the amount of externally generated funds. FSS find that thefirm will chose
a level of investment that is closer to theoptimal amount of investment if the cost of
financing is decreased through hedging. The model is limited, however, because it only
considers financing cost as a function ofthe level ofexternal financing. This model
addresses only the scale ofexternal financing without regard tothe amount ofassets that the
firm has to repay the sources of external finance. We will derive a result similar to that of the
FSS model using a cost function that is a function ofnot only the level ofexternal finance,
but also the value ofthe firm's assets. The model that we will develop will include the
underinvestment problem, but will also show how the cost ofdebt changes with hedging.
The theoretical model that follows helps to explain the empirical results ofauthors such as
Minton and Schrand (1999).
2. THE MODEL
2.1 Operating Cash Flow
Following FSS, let w be the time zero value of the liquid assets, and V be the value
of other productive assets net of existing liabilities. Thus, V is the net worth of the firm
excluding liquid assets. Both cash holding and asset value are random variables which are
independent. Therefore, at time zero, total value of the firm's assets is given by;
A = H'+ V
Also at time zero, the firm chooses the level of investment, / . This investment
includes all cash outflows spent to support sales and capital expenditures. The firm earns a
return on this investment as well as a return on real assets already held by the firm at time
zero. The one period value of a given level of investment and time zero assets with a zero
discount rate is given by:
nn+g{y)-i
where/(/) is the expected level of cash inflow (a money metric production function) given
the level of cash outflow, I. g(V) is the expected cash inflowon existingassets.
Combining the two piecesof the production function into a single function, /i(/, K), does not
change the results derived below. Also, assume that /^f/)>Oand fi,(I)<0. Then, the
time-zero present discounted value of a given level of investment in a risk neutral world is
given by:
fin+g{nWp{-rT)~f
where r is thecontinuous risk free interest rate andT is the amount of time in years between
time 0 and the time when the cash inflows are realized. We assume that all cash inflows
occurdiscretely at time one. The risk neutral assumption alleviates the need to calculate an
expected return on equity to discount cash flows because, in the risk neutral world, the
expected return on any investment is simply the risk free rate.
2.2 Financing Cost
The firm has two sources of funding for the optimal level of investment,/*. Funds
can be generated internally from liquid assets or from external sources. All external
financing, represented bye, will be obtained through the sale of zero-coupon bonds. As the
value of the firm's assets is stochastic, the firm has some positive probability of becoming
insolvent and defaulting on the promise to pay the face valueof the bondat maturity. Thus,
these bonds are risky to the bondholder and will be sold for some amount less than the
present value of face value when issued by the firm. We assume that the price of the bonds,
P'', is less than the price paid for a risk free bond with identical terms and maturity as the
risky issue. A model of default will be discussed later. The analysis couldbe extended to
include coupon bonds andbonds of varying maturities, but for the sake of clarity, wewill
address onlythe zero coupon case where the maturity date of thebond matches the length of
the production cycle so thatthe timing of cash inflows matches the timing of the repayment
of the bonds. Furthermore, the firm cannot raise additional external funds byissuing equity.
Because the bonds are sold at a price below that of risk free bonds, there is a
deadweight cost associated with obtaining funds from external sources. Hence, the firm will
choose to fund investment first byusing internally generated funds and then turning to
external sources to raise the difference between w(internally generated ftinds) and /'
(optimal level of investment). Therefore, once /* ischosen, e* isgiven by:
e = /' -w.
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where w is a random variable and /* is the solution to a profit maximization problem
presented below. This does not necessarily imply that the firm uses all of its cash to finance
investment. Obviously, most firms hold a certain amount of cash at all times. Here, assume
that the portion of cash that the firm withholds from investment financingwill be a portion of
V instead ofw.
2.3 The Cost Function
To explore the motivation to hedge, it is useful to first develop some general
characteristics of the cost of external financing. If the firm wereonly to sell one bondto
finance investment, then the present value of thecostof financing is given by the following:
C=^FVexp(-rT)-P'
This cost is the time-zero present value of cash outflow from external financing less the cash
inflow from external financing. Now, suppose that instead of sellingone bond, the firm
obtains fiinds externally by issuing $1 face value bonds. The firm sellsn such bonds. Then,
the total facevalue ofthe bonds is n and the net present cost of external finance per dollarof
face value is given by:
C=n[exp(-'-r)-P''
whereis now the time-zero price of the $1 face value bond. To simplify, note that, in the
risk neutral world, the discounted value of a dollar received at time T is equivalent to the
price of the risk free bondat time zero, . Then the above equation canbe rewritten as
follows:
C=n[p'-P")
In this expression, the total cost ofexternal financing is the difference between the price ofa
dollar lent and the price of a dollar borrowed multiplied by the number of bonds sold.
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Assume that the firm has perfect foresight of the value of P** in the short time interval prior
to the sale of the bonds. The firm will then sell a number of bonds, n , such that
e
n =
P'
Substituting into the cost function, the total cost of external financing can be written as:
\pj
C = e pb -1
In a departure from the FSSmodel, the cost ofexternal financing is a function of both
the amount of external financing, e, and the total value of assets at time zero, A because it is
assumed that P^\s a function of Aand e which will bedenoted P^(A,e). This coincides
with the Merton-Black-Scholes bond pricingmodel that will be used later, but we can obtain
certain general properties of the cost function as a result of this bond price structure. These
generalproperties will hold underotherbondpricing models as well.
To simplify notation, let
P^
—-1=
P'iA^e)
a measure of real bond yield. Then, since e is non-negative andnotingthat
dA dA
we can derive the general properties of C{P^,e) =C{A,e) = ey{A,e)hy deriving the
curvature properties of y(A^e). Intuitively, as the value of assets increases for a given level
of debt financing, the firm will be less likely to default on those debt commitments. Thus,
investors will be willing to pay more for a bond issued by a firm with a higher asset value.
IThis result comes from the identity e=I-w. Then de/dA =dl/dA - dw/dA == dl/dA. We then assume that an
increase in asset value will not have a negative affect on investment,
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Therefore, y^(A,e)<0 . Next, it is useful to think of the cost of financing in the limit as
A^O and ^ . As the value of the assets of the firm tends towards zero, investors will
not be willing to purchase the debt issued by the firm, as there are not sufficient assets to
keep the firm solvent. In that case, the price of the bonds tends towards zero. As we can see
from the definition of the bond yield,
f
\\my(A,e) - lim -1
P\A,e)
If the value of assets gets very small at the timeof bond issue, the bondyieldgets large
because the firm is not able to access debt markets. As the value of the assets tends towards
infinity, the probability of default becomes small and investors willonlydemand a return that
is equal to the risk free rateof return. Again, from the definition of bond yield, we have the
following:
Wm y{A,e)= lim
/4—»•»
-1
P\A,e) P^
-1 = 0
Thus, externally generated funds have the same costas internally generated funds when the
firm has a very large asset value.
Next, consider the level of debt, e and the yield function. As the level ofdebt
increases, ceteris paribus, there isa greater chance that the firm will default. This will push
the price of the bonds down. Therefore, y^{A,e)>0. As etends towards zero, the price of
the bondswill tend toward the priceof the risk free bond. Thus,
Iimy(i4,e) = lim
e-»0 e-»0
P^
P'iA,e)
-1
P^=^-1 =0
P^
13
External financing is costless for small levels of debt assuming that A is sufficiently large.
Finally, when the level ofdebt becomes very high for a given level of assets value, investors
will not be willing to pay a very high price for that debt, and in the limit, will not be willing
to pay anything for the debt. Thus,
Wmy{A^e) = lim -1
P\A,e)
V ✓
For very high levels ofdebt, the cost of debt tends towards infinity and the debt market
becomes inaccessible to the firm.
In summary, these characteristics of y{A,e) imply the following:
1) C^{A,e)<Q 3) C,(^,^)>0
2)C^(^,e)>0 4)C,,(^,e)>0
Together, these characteristics imply that the cost function is convex in both Aand e.
2.4 Profit Maximization
Following FSS, wemaximize profitby working backwards. First,we choose the cash
flow maximizing level of investment at time one (discounted back to time zero):
max
/
\f(I) +g{V)Y' - I-C(A,e)}
The first ordercondition for thismaximization problem is:
dl
dA deP'-\-C,{A,e)^~CM^e)^ = ^
df df
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Noting that
dV dA ^ , , de ^ dw ,
—,— = Oand that— = 1 = ,
dl dl dl dl
the first order condition can be written as:
f,(I)P'-\-CM.e) = 0
First, note thatwithwhen financing onlywithinternally generated funds or costless external
financing, the firm will set
/,(/)= '
The firm will increase investment until the return oninvestment is equal to the gross return
on a risk free bond. The cost of financing is the opportunity cost of those fundswhich we
assume to be the risk free return. Thus, the firm will use internally generated flinds to
finance investment up to the point where the expected return on the investment is equal to the
risk free return. This is a standard marginal product outcome where the firm continues to
invest until they don't realize a positive net return byspending more.
Turning to the casewhere external financing is costly, the firmwill continue to invest
until themarginal value product of investment is equal to the return on a bond usedto
finance that investment. Additionally, with costly external financing, the firm will invest at a
level that is less than the first best outcome offree external financing. SinceCp(/i,e) >0, the
firm continues to invest until
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This illustrates the underinvestment problem that occurs withcostly debt financing. If, by
hedging, the firm can reduce then the firm is able to invest more and realize a
higher gross return.
A necessary condition for this solution to be a maximum is that the second derivative
of cash flow with respect to investmentmust be negative:
/«(OP' -CJA,e)^- <0
at al
This condition always holds under the assumptions that /(/)is concave and C{A,e) is
convex in e.
2.5 Justification for Hedging: The Non-Linearity of Cash Flows
In the previous section, we derived profit maximizing conditions for the optimal
choice of investment. What remains to be found is under what conditions the firm can
increase firm value by hedging. As before, assume that f, (/) >0and f„ (/) <0.
Furthermore, to simplify the following argument, we will use a generalized function for the
cost ofexternal financing. Again, ]etC(y^,e)represent the time 0 total cost of external
financing. The C(/i,e)function has a negative first derivative with respect to the firm value
and is convex in firm's value.
The time zero present value of the cash flows ofthe firm is given by^:
CF,{A,I^e) =[/(/) +g{V)]p^ -/-C{A,e)
Throughout this paper, we denote the discounted cash flow between time zero and time one as CFq.
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To justify hedging, it is necessary to show that this function is concave inw, the only
variable that we are able to change by hedging (viewing the hedge as a decreasing total asset
value yields the same results). Therefore, it is sufficient to show that:
1. C/^„,(^/.e)>0
2. CF^JAJ,e)<0
First, consider the first derivative of cash flow with respect to w:
CF^iAJ,e) =
Using
dV
//(/)—+
dw dw dw dw dw
dw dw
and, by profit maximization,//-\-C^(A,e) = 0, the first derivative with respect
to wean be rewritten as:
dl
dw
= CM^e)~C,{Ae)
It then follows that the second derivative with respect to wis given by:
dw dw dw dw
\/,(I)P^-]-C^(A,e)\+CM,e)-C, (A,e)
C^(A,e) - C,.,{A,e)]+C,,(A,e)-C,AA,e)
Jw j
Before further development of this expression, it is useful to examine some
simplifying cases of dlfdwio extract some intuition. First, consider the case where, for a
one unit change in liquid assets, the firm spends two additional units, ovdIldw = 2. Then,
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the cash flow function is concave ifC^^{A,e) < C^^(A,e). To further simplify this result, it is
first helpful to notice that Q, (A,e) = MC(e) is the marginal cost of external finance.
Similarly, C^(A,e) = -MB(A) is the negative of the marginal benefit of additional real assets
or, more importantly, liquid assets (increased assets lowers borrowing cost). Then, the
necessary condition for concavity can be rewritten as
dMC(e) dMB(A)
de dA
When hedging increases w, Aincreases as well. Hedging then increases themarginal benefit
of external financing, MB{A), because of the convexityof the cost function inA. The other
effect of an increase in vt' is thate increases by oneunit. This will increase themarginal cost
of debt financing,MC{e), because of the convexity of the cost fiinction ine. Therefore, the
condition that {A, e) < (A, e) tells us that hedging is value creating if the hedge will
increase themarginal benefit of the increase incash more than itwill increase the average
cost as a result of the additional extemal financing that results from the increase in cash.
Informally, thiscondition implies some characteristics of the hedging decision. First,
hedging is notjustifiedwhen A because of the following characteristics of the cost
function:
limC^ =Oand limC., =0
/<-»0 -4->0
Onthe otherhand, hedging will also notbejustified fortherange of thecostfiinction that is
very convex me. This restriction, however, is not as clear as the restriction on the cost
fxinction with respect to ^ . If the cost function is veryconcave in both e andA, then it is less
clear whether or not to hedge.
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Next, we consider the casewhere investment is fixed, ordljdw = 0. Cashflow is
concave if:
Under the convexity assumptions imposed on the cost function, the right-hand-side of this
equation is always positive. In certain cases, such as when A is very large and e is very
small, the right-hand-side will tend towards zero because the cost function is not convex in
the limit in-<4 ande. Furthermore, the cross-partial derivative on the left-hand-sideof the
inequality will always be negative except in the limit when —> «> ore —> 0. That is, the
marginal effect of an increase inAon the marginal cost of debt with respect toe will be
negative. More intuitively, changes in the amount borrowed have a smaller effect on the
average cost ofdebt for larger asset values. Considering all of these characteristics, the
inequality is always true, except when A—^oo and e—>0. Therefore, except forcases of
extreme asset values and debt level, hedgingwill increase the expected cash flow ofthe firm.
Next, consider the case when = I. Here, additional cash is invested when
liquid assets increase, but no additional funds are borrowed. Cash flow is concave in w if
C^i^,e)<C^(A,e)
In contrast to the previous cases, C^^{A,e) is no longera concern as changes inw will not
changee. Thus, there is no change inmarginal cost of e with respect toe. There is,
however, a change in the average cost of ewith respect to . In this case, thechange in the
average cost of e with respect toAmustbe less than the change in marginal benefitwith
respect toAwhen Achanges. From theearlier discussion of the dl/dw = 2 case, this
condition will always hold except when e is very small orAisvery large.
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Ofcourse, it cannot be assumed that any of these simple cases is necessarily true, so
weneedto derive an expression foxdlldw. First, recall the first order condition that
f,{I)P^ - l-C^(A,e) = 0. Taking the total differential, we have the following:
Substituting
f„dlP' ~C„^dw-C^^dw=Q
aw aw
dA . , de dl .
= 1 and — = 1,
dw dw dw
dijdw iswritten as follows:
d!
dw
Then, rewrite the second derivative of cash flow as (dropping functional notation):
CF =
c ,-ccr
hP'-c,
VfnP'-C„\
Therefore, cash flow is concave if:
c -c +r -cVcc ^eA-^^eA ^AA
By signing each element ofthis expression, it can be shown that the inequality is always true
if iCj' - ^AA^^e^^^ production function is concave. Therefore, hedging may not be
necessary in the caseswhere the cost function is not very convex in assets and/or the level of
20
debt. Again, this will occur when the value of the firm's assets or the level ofdebt is very
large or very small. Furthermore, if it is assumed thatdljdw > 0, then
C ,-C
—^—-^>0
faP'-C„
and we can then show that hedging is alwaysjustified if . Thus, the necessary
condition collapses to the dljdw = 1 case. Notice also that, in a departure from the FSS
model, there maybe caseswhen concavity of the production function is not necessary to
justify hedging. A sufficiently convex cost function is enough to motivate hedging.
2.6 Hedging and Share Value
Whilewe will not empirically examine the effectof hedgingon share price,we can
show that share pricewill increase for two reasons. Wewill appeal to a simple discounted
cash flow model of firm valuation (see, for example, Ross, Westerfield, andJaffe (2002) or
Brealyand Myers (2000)). In this model, the value of the equityof the firm is equal to the
discounted value of all future cash flows to equity. The discount factor in this model is the
expected return to equity.
In the simplest version of the discounted cash flow model, the firm has constant
expected cash flow and expected return on equity forever. In this case, the value of the
firm's equity is given by:
Value = =^
Note that the definition of cash flow developed previously is cash flow to equity because it is
net of debt service.
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If, instead, we assume the fimi only exists for one period (as in our formal model),
the value of the firm is given by:
Value =^
1+ '-.
in this simple valuation model, the value of the firm will increasewith hedging for two
reasons. First, for the one period model, we showed that hedging will increase cash flow.
Thus, CF increases. Furthermore, the expected return on equity decreases. This follows
from the capital asset pricing model (CAPM).
According to theCAPM, the expected return on equity is givenby the following:
where is the expected return on a portfolio of all market assets and
^_Cov(rg,r^)
M
In practice, themarket portfolio is often a broad equity index. With hedging, the value of/?
will be at most equal to the value of without hedging except in the unlikely casewhen the
return on the hedging index andthe return on equity areboth negatively correlated with the
market portfolio^. This follows from the definition ofcovariance:
First, we assume that the standard deviation ofthe market portfolio ) is constant. Then,
because the value of the firm's assets is hedged, the volatility of the return on those assets
will decrease. Hedging will also act to decrease the correlation between the return on the
One commonly used proxy for the market portfolio is the S&P 500 index. The return onthe NASDAQ 100
index and the return on Intel stock and assets {the hedging index and the firm hedged, respectively) are both
highly positively correlated with the S&P 500 return.
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market portfolio and the return on the equity of the firm. Put simply, a decrease in market
risk decreases the expected return on equity, thus increasing the current value of the firm's
equity.
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3. SIMULATION METHODS
To examine the distributional implications of cash flow of this model, we construct a
simulation of the cost-of-debt portion of cash flow. While it might be more informative to
simulate all of cash flow of the firm, this presents many estimation problems which would
make the simulation umiecessarily complicated. Thus, the simulation will tend to understate
the benefits of hedging, but will demonstrate that the reduction in financing cost alone should
motivate the firm to hedge. Also, as was shown in the last section, the decision to hedge is
driven by the cost function.
To simulate the model, we use the stochastic nature of the asset values to generate a
large number (5000) of possible outcomes. In this case, we wish to simulate different
realizations of the cost of debt of the firm both when the firm hedges and when it does not
We then average over all of those realizations to obtain an estimate of the expected cost of
debt. It is important to use a high number of sample realizations in order to have
convergence of the sample mean to the true mean. Here, we appeal to the weak lawof large
numbers that, as the size of the sample tends towards infinity, the sample mean approaches
the true mean (see, for example,Miller, Miller, and Freund 1998). The "true mean" is not
meant to represent the true mean of bond yields in the real world, but rather the true mean
given the distributional assumptions of the parameters of the model.
3.1 Simulating the Complete Model
Recall that total discounted one period cash flow is given by the following:
CF,(A.I,e) = [/(!) +g(V)]P' -1 - ey(A,e)
The production function cannot be directly estimated, but we could model /(/) + f{V) as
operating cash inflow of the firm by estimatinga stochastic statisticalmodel from historic
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accounting operational cash flow as a random variable correlated to investment in the
previous period. Capturing the non-linearity of the production functions would be very
difficult using this method.
Another obstacle in simulating the entire model is that it requires simulation of liquid
asset and real asset values separately as the investmentdecision is based only on the amount
of liquid assets available. This requires another estimated correlation relationship between
the two types of assets. A related issue is the necessityof estimating an investment rule.
One possible way to estimate the investment rule is to regress historical investment on the
level of liquid and real assets. Thismethod would result in an under-investment simulation,
but it has littlegrounding in the actual model in thatno optimization is taking place.
Furthermore, this methodwould only be valid for a linearproduction function, violating one
of the basic assumptions of the model.
3.2 Hedging the Cost of Debt
Becauseof the shortcomings in simulating the entiremodel,we will focus onlyon the
cost of debt. This is similar to the case discussed earlier when the firm's investment decision
is fixed, oxdildw - 0. From the earlier discussion ofconditions under which hedging is
justified, we expect that hedging will always be value creating with a fixed investment policy
with the possible exception of extreme asset values and amounts of borrowing. We will
only be concerned with thedistribution ofey(A,e) with and without hedging. Furthermore,
since that eis a scaling factor, we can focus onthe "discounted" bond yield:
y(A,e) = — 1.
P^Ae)
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The simulation spans three discrete points in time. In the simulation, the length of the
interval between integer time indexes is one year. The time periods and the corresponding
events are as follow:
/ = -1: The firm places the hedge by purchasing a put option on an equity index that
is correlated with the value of the firm's assets. Assume that the put option is fairly
priced. That is, the price of the put is equal to the discounted expected payout of the
option given the distributional assumptions of the underlying asset. The underlying
asset here is the value of the NASDAQ 100 index, an index on which options are
actively traded. The fair pricing assumption implies that, on average, the discounted
payout of the option is equal to the price of the option and the net cost of the hedge is
zero. Also at time -1, we determine the value of the firm's assets (A_^) and the
volatility of the firm's assets ).
r = 0: A value of the firm's assets is realized following the asset value diffusion
model discussed below. The putoption thatwaspurchased at / = -1 paysoff and is
added to the value of the firm's assets. The firm borrowsan amount e by issuing
zero coupon bonds that mature in one year.
/ = 1: The face value of the funds borrowed at time zeroare repaid to the
bondholders. There is no need to simulate realizations of asset values at this time for
our purposes. The amount of time that passes between / = 0 and / = I is needed to
price the bonds that are issued at / = 0.
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The simulation is primarily a matterof estimating bondprices for different
realizations of asset values with and without the hedge. We use a Merton-BIack-Scholes
model of debt pricing, but this simulation could be done with a number of different pricing
models. The exact form of the pricing model is not the driving factor for the decision to
hedge, but rather the curvature of the bond yield with respect to asset value and level of debt.
3.3 Bond Pricing Models
There are countless bond pricing models that depend on a number of different factors.
Here, we will follow the arguments of Black, Scholes (1973) and Merton (1974) to developa
simple theoretical framework that represents a bond as an option. The hedging model could
be adapted to accommodate a variety of bondpricingmodels some ofwhich may be more
empirically tractable. Bond pricing models can generally be classified in three main
categories (Nandi 1998). The first category ofmodels is credited to Black, Scholes, and
Merton(henceforth BSM). As described below, this model uses the BSMoptionpricing
model to price the bond which is inherentlyan optionon the value of the firm's assets. A
closed-form equation is thenused to value the option. While theoretically appealing, this
model is often criticized, however, because its implementation requires the value of the
firm's assets as an input which may bedifficult to ascertain in that simple accounting
measures of the firm's asset value may be an inaccurate assessment of the true value of
assets. Asdiscussed later, work by Jones, Mason, and Rosenfeld (1984) andmore recently
by Hull, Nelken, and White (2003) offers a market driven solution to this asset valuation
issue. Furthermore, theBSM model only allows for default on the bond at maturity. Also,
theBSM framework is onlyapplicable to the zero-coupon bond, butmany others suchas
Vasicek have extended the model to include coupon bonds. Finally, the BSM model is
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attacked because it assumes that interest rates are fixed (Longstaff and Schwartz, 1995).
Despite its shortcomings, the BSM model is useful here, as it implicitly includes the
probability of bankruptcy and gives the cost of external financing an explicit function.
Furthermore, the magnitude of bond yields produced by the model is not as important as the
spread between the hedged bond yield and the un-hedged bond yield. Crosbie and Bohn
(2002) find that the BSM model is useful in ranking the yields of different firms. Therefore,
it is reasonable to use the BSMmodel, as we are interested in the spread between the hedged
and unhedged bond yields.
The next category ofmodel is the structural models. These models weaken many of
the assumptions of the BSMmodel. (Actually, the BSM model is a simple structural model.)
First, theyaremore realistic with respect to timing of default. While theBSM model only
allows for default at maturity, structural models allowfor default at any timebetween issue
and maturity when the firm is insolvent. These models further assume that the bondholders
receive some fraction of the face value of the debt in the event of default. This fi^action,
called the recovery ratio is known at the issue date. These models are also based on the value
of the firm's asset, somay be difficult to estimate, just as the BSMmodel.
The final group ofmodels is the reduced form models. These models have the
advantage over structural models and the BSM model that a value of firm assets is not
required. These models assume that the probability of default isdriven byanexogenous
random variable. Furthermore, using an expected recovery ratio given thatdefault has
occurred, the bondcanbe priced by its expected payoff. Default probabilities canbe
estimated using historical default probabilities based ona firm's bond orcredit ratings by
Fitch, Standard and Poor's, orMoody's (Delianedis and Geske 1999). One such model by
Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) incorporates both a default probability model andan interest
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rate risk model which results in more empirically supportable results that the BSM model.
While these models would generate the best empirical results in terms of the magnitudeof
the bond yield, they would be problematic in the hedging simulation. The time - I credit
rating of the firm is easily observable. It is not a simple matter, however, to simulate the
time zero bond rating. Fist, bond ratings are not calculated using any single metric ofdebt
serviceability. Rating agencies base the firm's credit rating on a number of factors including
debt to value and cash flow to debt service, but the rating is also basedon less tangible
measures such as the firm's future business prospects and the competitive climate of the
industry. Therefore, is difficult to formulate a rule to simulate ratingsmigration.
Furthermore, in practice, there may be a lag between the deterioration of the firm's financial
stabilityand a change in rating. Finally, a particular ratingmay cover a rangeof debt to
value levels, so there is significant non-continuityin the yield curve.
3.4 The Black-Scholes-Merton Model
In the Black-Scholes-Merton model, a bond is viewed as a longposition in cashand a
short put option'' (see also Giesecke 2003). First, suppose that the firm issues zero-coupon
bonds. Thezero-coupon bonds are sold in an auction system, presumably at a discount from
the face value of the bonds (assume a positive discount rate equal to the risk free rate for
potential bondholders). If thebonds were not sold at a discount, then they pay a negative
interest rate. This is a situation that we will not address here. Furthermore, there exists a
default free zero-coupon bond with identical maturity to the bond issued by the firm. The
continuous return on the default free bond is given by r. In practice, the default free bond is a
^We could view the bond as this same long position and short put option and use an option pricing method
other than the Black-Scholes-Merton method.
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US government issue such as a treasury bill for short maturities or a treasury bond for long
maturities.
The purchasers of the corporate bonds are promised a single payment equal to the
total face value of the bonds at maturity. The only other claimants on the firm's assets are
the equity holders. The equity holders' claims on the assets of the firm are subordinate to the
claims of the debt holders. That is, in the case of bankruptcy, bondholders are entitled to the
assets of the firm in an amount equal to the face value of the bonds that they hold. After the
bondholders have been paid, equity holders are entitled to the assets that remain. More
formally, if, atmaturity of thebonds, thevalue of the firm's assets per bond, Oj. ~ Aj-jn ,\s
greater than the face value of each bond ($1), then the debt holders will be paid $1 per bond.
Theequity holders are then leftwith assets with a total value of n{\-a^). If, on the other
hand, the face value of the debt is greater than the value of the assets, the firm will be in
bankruptcy. Bondholders will receive perbond at maturity. Some models depart from
this strict definition of bankruptcy (Crosbie and Bohn 2002). Such models are based on the
empirical observation that few firms actually file bankruptcywhen asset value falls below the
level of liabilities because of the long-term nature of some of the debt. Instead, there is a
"default point" atwhich bankruptcy actually occurs. The default point is characterized byan
asset value that lies between short-term liabilities and total liabilities. For the BSM model
used here, weonly have onebond issue, so there is nodistinction between long-term and
short-term liabilities generated by financing activities. All debt matures simultaneously.
As mentioned above, there are two possible outcomes in this model at time T. In the
first outcome, where > 1, the firm will pay the bondholders a total amount n. In the other
outcome, where Oj. <\, the firm does not have enough assets to payback the face value of
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the bonds. The bondholders receive the entire value of the firm's assets. Thus, the value of a
bond (to the bond holder) at maturity is given by:
Tn\T\{FVyaj) = min(l,aj.) = 1-max(l-ay.,0)
which is simply the face value of the bond less the value of a put option on the value of the
firm's assetswith strike price equal to the face valueof the bond. Figure is a
representation of the payoff of this option. If the value of the firm's assets is zero, then the
bond is worthless. As the value of the assets increases, but is still less than the face value of
the bond, there is a one-to-one relationshipbetween the value of the firm's assets and the
value of the bond. If the value of the firm's assets at time T isgreater than the face value of
the bond, then the value of the bond is equal to the face value of the bond.
3.5 Valuing the Contingent Claim
As is apparent from the position diagram inFigureA, it is a simple exercise to
determine the value of the bondat maturity. The valueof the firm's assets is known with
certainty at time T,so the payoffof the bond isknown with certainty. Valuing the option
prior to expiration isamore difficult and widely addressed task. For this European style
option (oran American option for that matter), it is necessary to determine the present value
ofthe expiration payoff. This, ofcourse, is made difficult by the uncertainty ofthat payoff.
At time t we do not know how much the option will pay at time Tor if itwill payoff at all.
There are a number of factors that affect the price ofan option at time t including the
current level of the underlying variable (at), the option strike price(FV, hereassumed to be
$1), the time to expiration (T-t), the volatility of the underlying variable, and the risk ft-ee
interest rate (Hull 2000). All of these factors affect the distribution ofthe payoffon the
option, and thus, the price of the option. The value of the put option will increase when at
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decreases, when FV increases, when the volatility of A increases, and when the risk-free rate
decreases. In turn, these factors will all determine the price of the bond at time zero.
The BSM model results inanexplicit function to value the option. Since a bond isa
combination ofa long cash position and a short put option, put option form ofthe BSM
model can be applied directly to the bond. With the strike price equal to the face value ofthe
bond ($1), the price of the bond is given by the following:
P' =FVe'^ - [FVe-'^ N{-d^^_AxN{~d,)
where
[a/
VFVf
In
and r isthe continuous risk free interest rate, a , is the volatility ofthe value ofthe assets of
the firm, Tis the time in years from time zero to maturity of the debt, and A/(*)is the
cumulative normal distribution with mean zero and variance one. We can use this pricing
model to study how different levels ofdebt (FV) affect the distribution ofdebt cost with and
without hedging.
For the practical matter ofsimulation using Intel Corporation data, we ran the simulation
using the following estimates for the parameters in the bond pricing model (all estimates are
on a per share basis):
1. r: The continuous return on aone United State Treasury Bill as reported as adiscrete
return in the Wall Street Journal.
2. A:The per share value ofthe firms assets at time zero is determined by amethod
described later using the volatility and current price ofthe firm's common stock.
^ 2 /\
/2
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3. O"^: The volatility of firms assets is found simultaneously with asset value.
4. T: The time horizon is arbitrarily set at one year.
5. FV; It would be very simple to run the simulation using a fixed face value of the bonds
for each realization of asset value at time zero. Doing that, however, result in variation in
the amount ofmoney borrowed ) for every different realization ofasset value at time
zero. Therefore, we chose to fix the amount borrowed and solve for the face value that is
implied by that fixed amount of borrowing for each realization in the simulation. Since
the BSM bond pricing model cannot be solved for FV, we have to use an iterative search
technique to find the face value of the bond at which the price of the bond is equal toe.
In our simulation, this was done using Solver in Microsoft Excel.
Values of each parameter are shown in Table A.
3.6 Asset Diffusion
To simulate the distribution of financing cost, we construct a simulation based on a
lognormaldiffusion of the value of assets. As we will show, a lognormal distribution ofasset
values follows from normally distributed asset returns. Thismethod is made necessary by
the use of the Black-Scholes-Merton model of debt valuation. The normality assumption has
its roots in literature that predates the work by Black, Scholes, and Merton, and has been a
point of contention since its inception. Forexample, Fama (1965) found that daily stock
returnshave a distribution that is more kurtotic thana normal. Hiswork suggested that stock
returns follow a Paretion distribution. Other authors, however, have found thatmonthly
returns are normally distributed (Blattberg and Gonedes 1974).
33
3.6.1 Geometric Brownian Motion and Lognormal Prices
The BSM results are built upon the assumption of geometric Brownian motion of
asset values (Hull 2000 and Durrett 1996). That is, the change in the value ofassets is given
by:
dA = ^^Adt'\-a^Adz
where is the drift rate of the asset value and dz isaWeiner process. Thus, in discrete
terms, Az = wheree is a random draw from a standard normal distribution. It then
follows from Ito's Lemma (for derivation, see Appendix B) that
Therefore,
d\nA = it-ha^dz
A
and
M,~ /2
InAj. InAq + 'n -V/2
or the asset value growth rate is normally distributed and, since the log of assets is normally
distributed, assets follow a lognormal distribution. The methods used to simulate the asset
diffusion model in Microsoft Excel are based primarily on the lectures ofDr. Dermot Hayes
(2001) at Iowa State University. Recent work by Arnold and Henry (2003), discovered after
the writing of this paper, discusses the technique in detail.
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3.6.2 Correlated Returns
To complete the simulation, it is also necessary to simulate the correlation between
the value of the firm's assets and the level of the hedging index as well as an asset diffusion
model for the index. The time zero realizations of index levels are found using the same
diffusion model used to simulate the asset value diffusion. The random draws used to
simulate the Weiner process for the index must be correlated to the random draw to simulate
the Weiner process for the firm's asset values. The target correlation between the index and
assets is calculated using historical values of asset values and index levels. In the simulation,
the correlation between the random draw for the Weiner processes is adjusted until the
correlation between the asset value and the index level is equal to the estimated historic
correlation between the two variables.
3.7 Estimation of Asset Value and Asset Volatility
In order to implement a hedging strategy underthis framework, it is necessaryto
establish somecharacteristics of the assetsof the firm. Specifically, wemust establish
historic values of assets from which we will estimate a correlation with the hedging
instrument. The simplestmethod of assigning a value to the firm's assetswould be to use an
accounting (book value) definition of asset value. This would be some notion of net worth of
the firm as represented on the firm's balance sheet. This, however, is an undesirablemethod
todetermine asset value as it is strictly an accounting definition which has the shortcoming
ofnot representing the actual market value of the firm's assets nor is it a valid metric to use
to determine the firm's ability to service it's debt. Toclarify this point, it isuseful to use the
definition ofanasset asthe discounted future cash flow associated with holding an
instrument. It is not possible to determine this discounted value using accounting definitions.
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Instead, we will use the market valueand volatility of the firm's equity to determine the
value of the firm's assets simultaneously with the volatility of the firm's assets.
Following a result developed by Jones, Mason, and Rosenfeld (1984) and further
refmed by Hull, Nelken, and White (2003), the following relationship between the market
value ofequity, volatility of equity, and the value and volatility of the firm's assets:
riE
(U
where:
E =time 0 value of the firm's equity,
ag =the time 0 volatility of the firm's equity,
A - the time 0 value of the firm's assets,
G^ =the time 0 volatility of the firm's assets.
E is observed inequity market data and is estimated using implied volatility reported by
Bloomberg. dE/dA can be represented asan option delta (Hull, Nelken, and White 2003).
To derive the specific option delta, first represent the valueof the equityof the firm as a
European option on the firm's value. As discussed previously, the firm can either be solvent
or in default at time T. Again, assume that the firm issues an amount ofdebt with face value
equal to FV at time 0. If, at time T, ^ > FV then the debt holders arepaid and amount FV
and equity holders are left with A-FV If, instead at time J, A<FV, then the debt holders
arepaid an amount A andthe equity holders are left with nothing. Therefore, the value of
the firm's equity at timeT is givenby:
Ej: =max(yij. - FV,0)
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Thus, the value of the firm's equity is a call option on the value of the firm's assets with a
strike price FV. To price the firm's equity at time 0, we simply apply the Black-Scholes-
Merton option-pricing model to the call. Therefore, the value of the firm's equity at time 0 is
given by:
E = AxN{d,)- FVe'''^ N{d^)
where
hiiv )+VFVr
^ ^2 /\
r + V/l
di=d,-a^4f
Notice that the delta of this call is given by:
f)F
We can now write equation (1) as:
EOg^ = N{d^)Aa^
Solving forAy this expression becomes:
Ea.
(2)
A =
a,N(dJ
This expression is then substituted into the above equation to obtain:
EOc
E =
a.Nid,)
N(d^)-LxN{d2)
=>1 =
<7,
a,Nid,)
Nid^)-LxN{d2y
where
d. =d, ~G,4f
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Thus, we can solve for <7^ using an iterative search technique on this equation. Notice that to
carry out this calculation, it is necessary to use an estimate of leverage (L). Intel had
virtually no debt at the time of the simulation, thus L = 0. We can then use equation (2) to
solve for the value of the firm's assets at time 0.
Certainly, this method of asset valuation is not without potential peril. There are
numerous recent examples in which the market as a whole has been duped by less than
forthright accounting practices which will miss-price equity, and therefore, assets. The
benefit of using this method, however, is imbedded in the premise that the market displays at
least some degree of efficiency. While this method is obviously imperfect, we contend that it
is at least as good as using pure accounting values. To create a time series of asset values,
we used end ofday equity prices from Yahooand implied equity volatility data from
Bloomberg for the two years ending November 20, 2003.
This method used to value the firm's assetsat time 0 does not directlytell us anything
about the future value of those assets. Inorder to carryout the simulation using the Merton
bond-pricing model, wemust assume that the value to the firm's assets follow a lognormal
diffusion process. Under different bondpricingmodels, it may be possible to relax this
assumption and use more sophisticated time series tools to model the value of the firm's
assets over time.
3.8 The Hedge Ratio
The hedging strategy that we will consider is a simple static fiill delta hedging
strategy. The basic idea behind ftill deltahedging is to holda position in an asset whose
value moves inthe opposite direction of the value of the variable that isbeing hedged. The
quantity of the hedging instrument is chosen such that the magnitude of the movement in the
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value of the hedged variable is the same as the magnitude of the movement in the value of
the hedging instrument. In this example, we will simply purchase a put option on a stock
index. To be an effective hedge, the option should pay off in the states of the world when the
value of the firm's assets is low. Using an option on a stock index in this case is actually a
cross hedge. A cross hedge is a hedge that uses an instrumentwhose value is not dependent
on the same underlying variable as the variable that is being hedged. A hedge that would not
be considered a cross hedge would be the purchase of a put option on the value of the firm's
assets. Choosing the index option to use is simplya matter of finding the index most closely
correlated with the variable that we which to hedge. If there is only a weak correlation
between the hedged variable and the index, the hedge will be ineffective as the values of the
two assets move (almost) independentlyofone another. This is an example of basis risk.
Not surprisingly, the NASDAQ 100 is the index that is most closely correlated of those tested
to the assetvalue of Intel Corporation. The NASDAQ 100 tracks the 100 largest companies
that trade on the NASDAQ exchange which is madeprimarily of technology companies.
Since Intel is also a technology company,we expect movements in the asset value of Intel to
closely track movements in the index value.
Here, we wish to hedge the value of the firm's assets, so we need to know how the
value of A changes with the value of the index option, NDX. Then,
A - ^Pndx _ ^Pmx dNDX ^ dNDX
* dA dNDX dA dA
where is the number of "units" of the firm's assets (we use assets per share) held for one
unit of the hedging instrument, is the value ofthe index put used for hedging, and
^ to index option with respect tothe value ofthe index. can easily
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be found by taking the first derivative of the Black-Scholes put option formula with respect
to NDX (Hull 2000);
p = S exp(-rr)A'(-i/2) - NDX • N{-d^)
where
( NDX\
In
d^ =
+(r + /2)r
and
df = d, —(Tvnr
and p is the time = 0 value of the put, S is the strike price of the put, A^(*) is the cumulative
probability distribution function (cdf) of a standard normal distributed variable, NDX is the
time= 0 valueof the index, r is the riskfree interest rate, T is the timeto expiration, and
<T ffDx is the volatility of the index value. Then, thederivative of the option value with
respect to the value of the underlying index is givenby:
dPmx _ _
dNDX
= A_=m)-l
NDX and T are easily observable S, the strike priceof the option is a choicevariable for the
firm. By choosing S, the firm can choose tohedge with anat-the-money, out-of-the money,
or in-the-money put. We simulated each of the three cases. There are two options for
calculatingain the optionspricing formula. First,we coulduse historical data to
calculate an estimate of cThis isnot the preferred method of calculation, however,
because cTjy^,,isan instantaneous volatility. Ahistorical estimation technique does not tell
us what the volatility is at the current time. To remedy this, we instead use the implied
volatility of the option as an estimate of as reported by Bloomberg. The estimate
ofA^ is-0.83.
Pndx
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Unfortunately, we are forced to rely on historic data to calculate dNDXjdA . This
ratio can be determined by running the following OLS regression:
NDX, =a + {iA, +e,
Wethenuse P~cr^j,pxl^A as m estimate ofdNDX/dA . In the simulation, the values of
NDX are daily values of the NASDAQ 100 index for the two years ending November 20,
2003. Daily asset values are calculating using Hull's method as described earlier. For the
base case, our estimated beta from the regression is 31.60. Also from this regression, we take
the square rootof the^^of the regression to obtain an estimate of correlation coefficient
between the value of the assets and the index. The estimated correlation was 0.9572. The
hedging delta is then equal to(-0.813)(31.6) = -25.70. This delta is then negated and
inverted(0.0389) to find the numberof put options per shareof stock thatmust be purchased
to place the hedge.
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4. SIMULATION ESTIMATES
4.1 The Base Case Simulation
The first simulation (the base case simulation), that we ran use the estimates of the
parameters from the firm's market data using an at-the-market put option as the hedging
instrument {TableA). As expected, the average cost ofdebt (bond yield) under the hedge is
considerably less that the average cost of debt for the unhedged case. Of course, this result is
driven by the decrease in variance of time zero asset value. As expected, the time zero mean
value of assets in the hedged and unhedgedcases are almost the same (unhedged 65.77 and
hedged 65.91). Furthermore, there is a significant decrease in the standard deviation of the
time zero asset value (unhedged 21.38 and hedged 15.71). A histogramof the realizations of
asset values for the unhedged case is represented in Figure B. The hedged asset value
distribution in shownin Figure C, and both distributions are showntogether in outline in
Figure D for comparison. Just as suggestedby the descriptive statistics of the distributions,
there is much less dispersion in the hedged case.
Because the yield function is convex in assetvalue, it is necessarily true that the
average cost of debt will be lower when the standard deviation of asset value decreases. For
the base case simulation, the average discounted bondyield decreased from 1.878% for the
unhedged case to 0.8745% for the hedged case. The spread between the unhedged yield and
the hedged yield is 1.003%. The ratio ofthe unhedged yield to the hedged yield is2.15. By
failing tohedge, the firm more than doubles its financing cost. An added benefit ofhedging
is that the variance of the discounted bond yield will be lower than in the unhedged case,
making it easierto forecast future yields. Forthe hedged case, the standard deviation of the
yield is 0.00793488. For the unhedged case, the standard deviation of the yield is
0.02611464. The ratio of the unhedged standard deviation to the hedged standard deviation
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is 3.29. A histogram the unhedged yield realizations is shown in Figure E. The hedged
distribution is shown in Figure F, and both distributions are shown together in Figures G and
H.
The histograms give some insight into the benefit of hedging. As can be seen in
Figure G, hedging decreases the frequency ofextremely low bond yields. This occurs
because of the outlay ofmoney required to place the hedge. In the cases where the
realization of asset value is high, the level of the index will be high as well. Therefore, the
put used to hedge will not pay off and the asset value will be decreased by the time -1 cost of
the hedge. On the other hand, Figure H also shows the source of the benefit of the hedge.
Figure H is the right tail of the two distributions. The hedged distribution truncates before
the unhedged distribution. It is clear that, for this particular hedging strategy, the decrease in
the average cost of debt is a result of the diminished probability of extremely poor bond yield
outcomes
Another metric included in each table reporting the simulation results is the per share
increase in cash flow (per share cost reduction) given the hedge. The per share cost
reduction is calculated by multiplyingthe spreadbetween the hedged and unhedged bond
yields by the amount of borrowing. This cost reduction metric is identical to the
representationof cost in the cash flowmodel and is equal to the following:
/
iL
p!
-I — e
(P^ \
-1
where P^ is the price ofthe bond in the unhedged case and P^ is the price ofthe bond in the
hedged case. In thebase case, this pershare cost reduction is approximately $0.33, which is
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a substantial increase in cash flow, particularly if that increase continues for every period into
the future.
It is worth noting at this point that an extension of the model may lead to even greater
decreases in the cost of debt. Ifwe were to either extend the hedge to time one or place a
new hedge at time zero that pays off at time one, we would decrease the expected volatility
of the firm's assets between time zero and time one. This, in turn, would decrease the value
of the put option portion of the bond valuation formula, thus increasing the price of the bond
and decreasing the bond yield. There may be a credibility problem with this addition to the
hedging strategy as the firm has no incentive to hedge once the bonds are sold. The firm,
however, does not have any particular incentive not to hedge as the hedge, on average, is
costless.
4.2 Strike Price of the Hedge
We ran another set of simulations in which we varied the strike price of the put option
usedto hedge. Table B shows the outcomes of these simulations. The first rowrepresents
the base case simulation using an at-the-money put option. The next two rowsshow the
results for in-the-money puts. Forexample, the second line shows the outcome for theput
with a strike price that is 125% of the timezero valueof the NASDAQ 100 index. The last
line of the table shows the outcome fora put strike price that is only90%of the time zero
value of the index.
As canbe seen in Table B, there is little difference between the average bondyield
generated with theat-the-money putand varying levels of in-the-money puts. This is to be
expectedas all of those options havealmostthe samenet payout (net of the cost of the
option) for any downward movements in the index. The at-the-money put will not payoff in
44
a few situations when the in-the-money puts do payoff, sowe expect the yield for the at-the-
money case to beslightly greater than the in-the-money cases. The out-of-the-money put is
less effective in decreasing the average bond yield because the option does not pay offfor
smaller downward movements in the index value. Inotherwords, there is a minimum
decrease in value in the index that must occur before the hedge become effective.
4.3 Debt Level
The next group ofsimulations that we ran is for different amounts ofborrowing. As
canbeseen in Table C, the benefit of hedging increases as the amount of debt increases over
the range studied. Here, the debt ratio ismeasured as the ratio ofdebt to the total value (debt
and equity) ofthe firm. As suggested earlier, the hedge is oflittle benefit for very low levels
ofdebt. In fact, at the 5% debt level, the spread between the unhedged yield and the hedged
yield is less than l%x 10 ''and the total discounted cost reduction is only aboutSlxlO"^ per
share. The positive relationship between level ofdebt and the yield spread suggests that, for
higher levels ofdebt, the yield ftinction ismore convex in asset value. We will not examine
this relationship analytically, but, as can be seen in Figure J, the yield curve for the 75% debt
level appears to be more convex than the yield curve for the 50% debt level for most of the
range over which we have observations.
4.4 Risk Free Rate
Finally, we ran simulations with a number ofdifferent risk free interest rates. As can
be seen in Table D, it is difficult to specify the effect ofhigher risk free interest rates on the
yield spread, but there is apositive relationship between the bond yield and the risk free rate.
Intuitively, there are anumber of things that occur with the increase in the risk free rate (Hull
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2000), but for our simulation, the important affect is on the payoff of the hedging option.
The expected growth rate of the index value increases. It then follows that the index option
does not pay off quite as often for a higher risk free rate when an at-the-money option is used
to hedge, even for negative changes in asset value in some realizations. Obviously, this
effect is not very great.
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5. CONCLUSION
We have shown that hedging is warranted in many cases based only on the savings in
the cost of debt. The magnitude of the bond yield decrease when the hedge is undertaken
depends on a number of factors such as the strike price of the option used and the level of
debt issued by the firm. As hypothesized, however, we found certain conditions under which
the benefit to hedging is minimal such as when the amount borrowed is very small.
Therefore, firms that have little chance of requiring external finance, do not have a
motivation to hedge.
While hedging to reduce the cost of debt is promising, there is another benefit of
hedging that we were not able to explore in the simulation, but which add value to the firm.
As suggest by Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein, the firm is able to increase investment spending
by hedging cash flow. Cash flow hedging is, in fact, what we have done in our simulation.
We need only to be able to estimate cash flow and a production function in conjunctionwith
the estimation that we have already done here.
While our research did not uncover any evidence that this type of hedging is prevalent
in practice, it is difficult to know exactly what types of hedges firms use because of the lack
of reporting of financial derivatives transactions. The size of the derivatives market is
growing, but thatdoes not tell us exactly how those derivatives are being used. Studies by
Allayannis andMozumdar (2000) andbyAdam (2002) offer support to the use of hedging to
reduce dependence on expensive external financing. What remains to be explored is the
extent to which hedging firms seek to reduce the unit cost of debt. As we increase our
understanding ofhedging and firms are able to implement transparent and effective hedging
strategies, this typeof cash flow hedging should become more widespread.
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Appendix A: The FSS model
The expected net present value of the level of investment of the firm, I, is given by
the following:
/(/)-/
where /(/) is positively sloped and concave in I. The discount rate is set at zero for
simplicity.
Investment expenditure is funded first by internally generated funds, w, and then by
borrowed funds, e. Thus,
/ = w+ e
Since the discount rate is zero, creditors only require a repayment of e at time I.
Furthermore, there is a deadweight cost associated with external finance given by C(e)
which is convex ine. Therefore, profit is given by the following:
P{w) = /{!)-1-C{e)
The first order condition of profit maximization is:
//-1 = C.
Thefirst order condition implies that there is underinvestment when external financing is
costly. Theauthors then show that the second derivative of profit with respect to liquid
assets is given by the following:
p = f —' J il J
aw
Thus, hedging isjustified (profit is concave in cash) if the production function is concave in
the level of investment and the effect of additional cash on theoptimal level of investment is
positive.
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Appendix B: Derivation of the Distribution of Asset Values
In this appendix, we will derive the properties of the distribution of asset value at time
zero. The derivation follows closely from Hull (2000). First, we assume that the change in
the value of assets follows Geometric Brownian Motion:
dA= fX^Adt + a ^Adz
wheredz is a Wienerprocess. By lto*s Lemma (seeHull (2000) for a complete proof), we
have the following;
dG =
It then follows that
ac , dG \ ro 2 .
+ —H—^rCrtA
' dt ' r dA
J
Then, letG = In >4. We can then solve for the parameters of the above equation as follows:
dA A
a'G 1
dA'
dt
= 0
A'
J J
dG = \nA =
<j'
J^A- it + <j^dz
Appendix C: 1'ables and Figures
Table A: Base case parameter values
Parameter
P A.Nox
G
NDX
NDX Option Price
NDX
-1
*-i
dNDX
dA
Estimate
0.957181
0.0122
0.352157
0.2894
11.13
1363.49
32.89
31.5973
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